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INTRODUCTION 
On May 30, 2002, investigators in Storm Lake, Iowa found a 
dead baby at a recycling center.1  The four-day-old boy had been run 
through a shredding device.2  In search of more information to assist 
in investigating the crime, the county attorney subpoenaed records 
from the Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, a women’s clinic, 
seeking the names of women receiving pregnancy tests from August 
2001 to May 2002 at the organization.3  Other clinics and a local 
hospital cooperated with police and provided this information,4 but 
Planned Parenthood refused, calling the subpoena a “horrible assault 
to a young woman’s sense of privacy.”5 
Buena Vista County District Judge Frank B. Nelson twice 
ordered the clinic to turn over the records, but the State Supreme 
Court stayed enforcement of the subpoena and scheduled a hearing 
for Planned Parenthood’s appeal in December 2002.6  Prosecutors in 
Buena Vista County argued that the Iowa statute governing physician-
patient privilege applies only to oral testimony in court.7  They also 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law 2004, B.S.J. Northwestern 
University 1998. 
 1 Adam Clymer, Furor as Baby Death Goes Unsolved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2002, at 
A1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; see also John McCormick, Court Blocks Search of Pregnancy Data; Death Probe 
Raises Privacy Concerns, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2002, at 1; Rekha Basu, Iowa D.A. Seeks Data 
on 100s of Prenatal Patients, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/articles/020704_ 
patientprivacy.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (on file with author). 
 7 IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2002). Communications in professional 
confidence: 
(1) A practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, physician’s 
assistant, registered nurse practitioner, mental health professional 
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argued that no doctor-patient privilege existed because the staff 
administering pregnancy tests at the Planned Parenthood clinic are 
not necessarily nurses or doctors; indeed, non-medical professionals 
are allowed to administer pregnancy tests at the clinic.8  Planned 
Parenthood attorneys countered by citing a 1993 case where mental 
health records in Iowa were found to be private medical records and 
were afforded some protection by the Constitution, subject only to a 
balancing test.9  Complicating matters is Storm Lake’s transient 
population, which makes many doubt the child’s mother even lived 
in the area at the time she may have requested a pregnancy test.10 
In October 2002, however, state officials withdrew their request 
for the information, citing time, expense, and the prospect of endless 
litigation regarding the decision.11  Thus, left unresolved is the crucial 
issue regarding the privacy protection and the confidentiality of the 
personal health information of unidentified parties in the face of 
criminal investigation.  This conclusion to the litigation does not 
necessarily diminish the threat of similar attacks on privacy in the 
future, by Iowa or other states.  Indeed, it may have deprived 
 
. . . who obtains information by reason of the person’s 
employment . . . shall not be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose 
any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person 
in the person’s professional capacity, and necessary and proper to 
enable the person to discharge the functions of the person’s office 
according to the usual course of practice or discipline. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, because they requested the pregnancy tests during the 
investigation of the crime, prosecutors contended that the statutory privilege could 
not be applied.  See Clymer, supra note 1. 
 8 Tresa Baldas, A Legal Tug-of-War: Privacy v. Criminal Probe, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 19, 
2002, at A4. 
 9 See McMaster v. Iowa Bd. of Psychology Exam’rs, 509 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa 1993) 
(holding that mental health professional-patient privilege did not bar disclosure of 
patient’s records, but could not be subpoenaed unless it was shown that the need for 
records outweighed patient’s right to privacy).  Planned Parenthood’s position is also 
bolstered by the common-law definition of doctor-patient privilege, the traditional 
elements of which were articulated by Dean Wigmore: 
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will 
not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to 
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that 
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications 
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation. 
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (1st ed. 1904). 
 10 McCormick, supra note 6, at 1. 
 11 Staci Hupp, Officials Yield in Demand for Records of Pregnancy, DES MOINES REG., 
Oct. 10, 2002, available at http://www.dmregister.com/news/stories/c4788993/ 
19433042.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (on file with author). 
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defenders of privacy rights an opportunity to close an important gap 
in privacy protection. 
This Comment examines the gap in privacy protection left 
between the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
search and seizure and common law and statutory provisions 
regarding doctor-patient privilege.  It further explores the effect of 
this gap on women seeking the counsel and services available at 
reproductive health clinics. Part I outlines the privacy protections 
afforded by the United States Constitution, particularly those 
provided by the Fourth Amendment.  Part II discusses the doctor-
patient privilege asserted by state and common law.  Part III then 
probes the limitations of these protections in guarding individuals 
from invasions of privacy in the face of state criminal investigations.  
In particular, it focuses upon the possible reach of the third party 
doctrine, which may limit Fourth Amendment protections when a 
request for an individual’s information is directed to a third party 
institution.  Finally, Part IV reconsiders the third party doctrine in 
cases involving medical privacy.  It concludes that the third party 
doctrine should not be applied in these situations because of the 
unique aspects of the doctor-patient relationship, which do not exist 
in other situations where individuals reveal information to third 
parties.12 
The Iowa court’s order supporting prosecutors’ blanket request 
for the records of all women who visited the clinic amounts to a 
judicially sanctioned fishing expedition, which ignores any probable 
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.13  Furthermore, the 
state’s restrictive reading of the doctor-patient privilege also 
contributes to an invasion of the privacy of hundreds, if not 
thousands, of women.  The problem also has the potential to be 
neatly sidestepped by law enforcement officials.  They may rely upon 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in 
United States v. Miller,14 in which the Court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
 
 12 See id. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), involved the government 
issuing subpoenas to banks to produce defendants’ financial records.  See discussion 
at Part I infra. 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be searched. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 14 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”15  
The case involved the government issuing subpoenas to banks to 
produce defendants’ financial records.16  The Court held there was 
no expectation of privacy because the documents were “voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business.”17  Thus, in this extraordinary situation, 
privacy protection may not extend to women visiting reproductive 
health clinics. 
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The Supreme Court recognizes a right to privacy in more than 
one provision of the United States Constitution.  Notably, the Court 
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to hold substantive due 
process rights,18 which protect intimate personal relations.19  These 
substantive due process rights range from parental control over the 
education of their children20 to the selection of reproductive 
options.21  In Griswold v. Connecticut,22 Justice Douglas turned to 
“penumbras” of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to 
find a “zone of privacy” to protect intimate relationships.23  At least 
one scholar, however, notes that the Court has moved away from 
relying upon substantive due process to protect liberty interests in 
recent years, and its temperament likely “precludes any growth or 
invention of new guarantees beyond those bound to the 
 
 15 Id. at 443. 
 16 Id. at 438.  The banks produced the records but failed to notify the defendant 
of the request.  Id. 
 17 Id. at 442.  The third party doctrine is discussed more in depth in Part III infra. 
 18 “The doctrine that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments 
require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate 
governmental objective.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (7th ed. 2000). 
 19 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 420 
(1997).  The substantive due process doctrine allows courts to look at whether there 
is sufficient justification for government action interfering with the constitutional 
rights of the individual.  See id.  Whether there is adequate reasoning for this type of 
action depends upon the level of scrutiny used by the court.  See id. 
 20 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that required 
attendance of children at public rather than private schools was unconstitutional as 
the child was not a “mere creature” of the state). 
 21 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a person holds rights 
against “unwarranted governmental intrusion” when making decisions about 
reproduction). 
 22 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 23 Id. at 484.  Justice Douglas wrote that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give them 
life and substance.”  Id. 
  
2004 COMMENT 1097 
constitutional text and the accepted values associated with it.”24 
An explicit source of privacy protection, however, can be found 
in the Fourth Amendment declaration against unreasonable search 
and seizure.25  On its face, the text provides protection against the 
search and seizure of people and their possessions without probable 
cause, and also requires a warrant that specifically states what is to be 
examined or taken.26  The Supreme Court supported the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as a bastion of privacy as 
early as 1886, with its ruling in Boyd v. United States.27  Boyd involved a 
court order directing partners to produce a business invoice for a 
shipment alleged to have been received without payment.28  The 
Supreme Court held that the subpoena duces tecum was 
unconstitutional under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.29  
The Court found there was an “intimate relationship between the 
[Fourth and Fifth] [A]mendments” and declared that the essence of 
the offense lay in “the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has 
never been forfeited [due to] his conviction of some public 
offense.”30 
While the Fourth Amendment focuses upon protecting privacy 
against government activities,31 it allows for permissible searches and 
seizures, provided that the procedure of obtaining a warrant 
supported by probable cause is followed.32  The purpose of the 
warrant provision is to “prevent searches from turning into ‘fishing 
expeditions’” by inserting an independent party into the process, in 
the form of the judiciary, to ensure that the government has cause for 
 
 24 Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Quest for Privacy: State Courts and an Elusive Right, 
65 ALB. L. REV. 945, 952 (2002).  But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(holding that homosexuals’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them 
a right to engage in consensual sexual activity in home without intervention of 
government). 
 25 Friedelbaum, supra note 24, at 946. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 12 for full text of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 27 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 28 Id. at 620. 
 29 Id. at 630. 
 30 Id.  Because Boyd involved business documents, however, the Court’s 
statements about non-business documents are generally considered to be dicta.  See 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 252-55 (1980). 
 31 See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1084, 1118 (2002).  Government activity, in both civil and 
criminal cases, is limited to “searches” and “seizures.”  Id.  For example, activities 
such as seeing things in public are not searches.  Id. 
 32 See id. 
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search and seizure.33  Probable cause requires the government to have 
“reasonably trustworthy information . . . to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed,” or that evidence will be found in the place to be 
searched.34  It requires more than a “bare suspicion” and is measured 
on a case-by-case basis.35 
Furthermore, even if the requirements to obtain a valid warrant 
are met, the Fourth Amendment prohibits searches that are 
unreasonable.36  The Court, however, has rarely found that a search 
accompanied by a warrant supported by probable cause was 
unreasonable.37  Commentators have noted that, when addressing the 
question of what is “reasonable,” the Court has failed to sufficiently 
narrow the meaning to render it effective as a protection of privacy 
rights.38 
In the late 1960s, Fourth Amendment interpretations underwent 
a paradigm shift.39  Rather than concentrating on property interests 
in determining whether or not an unreasonable search occurred,40 in 
Katz v. United States,41 Supreme Court Justice Harlan articulated a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.42  The Court declared 
 
 33 See id. at 1125. 
 34 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. U.S., 
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 35 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 
 36 See AKIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (1997). 
 37 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the withdrawal 
of blood to test for blood alcohol level was reasonable).  But see Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that a surgical incision to remove a bullet from the 
suspect’s body to provide evidence was unreasonable, even pursuant to a warrant). 
 38 See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1645, 1687-88 (1988).  Colb points out the 
lack of teeth in the Court’s current Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and 
proposes that the Court “recognize that an ‘unreasonable’ search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment occurs whenever the intrusiveness of a search outweighs the 
gravity of the offense being investigated.”  Id. at 1687-88; see also Tracy Maclin, 
Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government Perspective: Whose 
Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 719 (1988). 
 39 Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to 
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1303 (2002); Solove, supra 
note 31, at 1128-33. 
 40 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that wiretapping 
of an individual’s phone was not an unreasonable search).  The Court stated that 
“[t]he reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument 
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the 
wires beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 466. 
 41 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 42 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  Katz 
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that what a person intends to keep as private, even in “an area 
accessible to the public,” is constitutionally protected.43  Justice 
Harlan, in concurrence, referred to a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test, which looks to whether a person shows an actual or 
subjective expectation of privacy.44  This test also looks to whether 
society is prepared to recognize the individual’s expectation of privacy 
as reasonable.45  The Court indicated that the expectation of privacy 
turns on what a person exposed to the public, characterizing it as a 
form of secrecy.46  Using this rationale, a person could not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that he or she 
divulges.47 
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,48 the Court upheld the police’s 
warrantless use of a pen register49 to record the numbers dialed from 
the home telephone of a robber charged with making obscene phone 
calls.50  It reasoned that because people know the phone company 
keeps track of the numbers dialed for billing purposes, they cannot 
hold a reasonable expectation that this information will be kept 
secret.51 
More recently, in California v. Greenwood,52 the Court applied the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy test” in holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect against the search and seizure of 
garbage left for collection in an area accessible to the public.53  In 
that case, a police officer asked a garbage collector to give her the 
trash bags that Greenwood left on his curb after she learned that a 
 
overruled Olmstead.  Id. at 356. 
 43 Id. at 351. The Court went on to make the famous declaration that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people, not places.”  Id.  Justice Stewart further noted that 
modern life involved many activities considered private, such as speaking on the 
phone, taking place outside of the home: “No less than an individual in a business 
office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may 
rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 352. 
 44 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Solove, supra note 31, at 1131. 
 47 Id. 
 48 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 49 A monitoring of the telephone numbers that a person had called.  See id. at 740 
n.4; Eugene Volokh & David Newman, In Defense of the Slippery Slope: Despite the 
Metaphor’s Poor Reputation, a Good Decision Now Can Lead to a Bad One Later, 2003-APR 
LEGAL AFF. 21, 22 (2003). 
 50 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. 
 51 Id. at 743. 
 52 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 53 Id. at 39. 
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truck carried drugs to Greenwood’s home.54  During a warrantless 
search of the bags, the investigator found items indicative of drug 
use.55  In upholding the legality of the search, the Supreme Court 
held that the search would violate the Fourth Amendment “only if 
respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage 
that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”56 
In the thirty years since the Katz decision, courts have 
increasingly narrowed the decision’s scope by making numerous 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.57  Furthermore, the Fourth 
 
 54 Id. at 37. 
 55 Id. at 37-38. 
 56 Id. at 39 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. 
Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 200 (1990) (holding that a determination of the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy “start[s] from the premise that 
[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social norms”) (quoting Robbins 
v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981)). 
 57 See Solove, supra note 31, at 1119; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) 
(holding that police could stop and frisk an individual without a warrant or probable 
cause if there was a sufficient basis for the officer’s suspicion). 
Another important exception to warrant requirements made since the Katz 
decision include searches made incident to and contemporaneously with a lawful 
arrest.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limiting searches incident to 
arrest to immediate areas, and noting that entire houses cannot be searched 
pursuant to this rule); see also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing the 
person to be searched after lawful arrest); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 
(allowing the search of the interior of a vehicle pursuant to lawful arrest in areas 
within the arrestee’s immediate control). 
The Court has also made an exception to the warrant requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment in cases involving exigent circumstances, such as investigations 
involving “hot pursuit,” an imminent threat to persons or property, or the potential 
destruction of evidence.  See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967) (holding that the scope of the search must reasonably be as broad as 
necessary to protect against the danger posed by the suspect at large). 
The Court found a diminished expectation of privacy for vehicle and container 
searches.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (stating that law 
enforcement must only show that it was reasonable to forgo the warrant procedure, 
and requiring probable cause); see also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (reasoning 
that if search would have been reasonable because of probable cause at the scene 
then a vehicle could also be examined at the police station without a warrant); 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (stating that probable cause is not 
determined by the nature of the container where contraband is stored, but by the 
object of the search itself and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it 
may be found); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 265 (1999) (stating that, for 
purposes of searches, there is no distinction between the passenger and driver of the 
vehicle). 
The Court has allowed relaxed requirements for inventory searches in the 
interest of  protecting the owner’s property as well as protecting law enforcement 
from danger and from claims for lost or damaged property.  See South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (stating that, even if an inventory is categorized as a 
“search,” it is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” standard); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) 
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Amendment is generally interpreted only to protect procedural 
privacy.58  This approach is concerned only with government officials 
following proper protocol in obtaining a warrant to conduct a 
search.59  Theoretically, individual privacy concerns can only be set 
aside where the government shows a basis for believing that a search 
would uncover evidence of a crime.60  Critics arguing for a more 
substantive approach—one that is more fact-sensitive rather than 
categorical—want an inquiry that applies a modified balancing test to 
determine whether the government’s interest in criminal 
investigation can override the privacy interests of the individual.61  
Constitutional provisions protecting the individual against 
government intrusion are neither rigid nor comprehensive, and the 
Court’s proclivity to allow law enforcement some latitude in the 
application of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
could leave a person’s most intimate and personal information 
exposed in the face of even a broad and unfocused investigation.62 
 
(allowing the search of personal effects incident to lawful arrest as part of routine 
administrative procedure in booking and jailing the suspect); Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367 (1987) (requiring that inventory searches be shown to be in good 
faith). 
In instances of law enforcement seeking consent to conduct a warrantless 
search, the Court has not required that the subject be informed of his right to 
decline the officer’s request, but rather has concentrated on whether or not the 
consent was given voluntarily.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 
(holding that, even though person was not informed of his right to refuse consent to 
search, the consent was still given voluntarily); see also U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 
(1974) (holding that a spouse residing in the same home may consent on behalf of 
the other spouse); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (holding that police 
search based on mistaken belief that person giving consent had apparent authority to 
do so was valid because of their reasonable belief that the consent was valid). 
The Court has also allowed searches and seizure of objects in plain view when 
the criminal nature is immediately apparent and there is a lawful right to the object 
itself.  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (holding that warrantless search 
of object in plain view was allowable, even though its discovery was not inadvertant); 
see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (noting that the object examined by law 
enforcement in plain view cannot be manipulated or moved without probable 
cause). 
 58 See Colb, supra note 38, at 1643-45. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1644. 
 61 Id.  Professor Colb argues that the individual’s sense of security and privacy is 
so important that courts should engage in a balancing test weighing the service that 
the government search provides to the public against the individual’s privacy interest 
even in situations in which the government must also provide probable cause and a 
warrant.  Id. at 1642.  She goes on to recommend that the Supreme Court recognize 
that a search is unreasonable whenever “the intrusiveness of a search outweighs the 
gravity of the offense being investigated.”  Id. at 1645. 
 62 See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 1. 
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II. STATE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
BETWEEN PATIENTS AND DOCTORS 
Common law, statutes, and state constitutions bolster the privacy 
protection offered by the Constitution, and one may look to state law 
and practice to seek relief from a breach of privacy by the 
government.63  Furthermore, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) is another avenue for privacy 
protection.64  HIPAA mandates federal privacy regulation for medical 
information disclosed to law enforcement officials, previously a 
concern primarily left to the states.65  Regulations apply to “health 
plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers.”66  
Because the purpose of HIPAA is to simplify and standardize the 
processing and transmission of health care information, however, the 
privacy rule only applies to providers who conduct insurance-related 
transactions.67  Thus, the somewhat limited protections afforded by 
HIPAA would be unavailable to women visiting to a free reproductive 
health clinic. 
Although the Iowa Constitution contains language that is very 
similar to that of the Fourth Amendment,68 the United States 
Constitution sets a standard of protection for individual rights upon 
which states may expand.69  In his dissent in United States v. Miller, 
 
 63 U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the 
“emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional 
protections of individual liberties . . . protections pervading counterpart provisions of 
the United States Constitution, but increasingly being ignored by decisions of this 
Court”) (internal citations omitted); see also William Brennan, State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 64 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160-64 (2002).  The primary purpose of HIPAA, however, was 
to permit employees to switch jobs without having the new health plans exclude pre-
existing conditions, and privacy was not comprehensively addressed at the time 
legislation was passed.  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW 210 (2003) [hereinafter INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW]. 
 65 INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 64, at 207. 
 66 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2002).  “Health care provider” is defined as a “provider of 
medical or health services . . . and any other person or organization who furnishes, 
bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.”  45 C.F.R.                 
§ 160.103.  Examples of “health care providers” include physicians, hospitals, and 
pharmacists.  See INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 64, at 210. 
 67 INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 64, at 211. 
 68  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons and things to be seized. 
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8 (Iowa Bill of Rights—Personal security—searches and 
seizures). 
 69 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that the 
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Justice Brennan approved the emerging trend of relying on state 
constitutions for protection of individual rights, as he supported the 
California Supreme Court’s more expansive interpretation of the 
state’s constitutional provisions.70  Furthermore, Justice Brennan 
noted that parties might seek redress for invasion of privacy at the 
state level, where more protections are afforded.71  Following this 
reasoning, some state courts have explicitly held that their state 
constitutions are more protective of individual rights than the federal 
Constitution.72  For example, in Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police,73 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals stated that “[i]n determining whether 
compelling reasons exist, several factors may be considered, including 
any significant textual differences in parallel provisions of the federal and 
state constitutions, state constitutional and common-law history, and state law 
preexisting the constitutional provision.”74  In addition, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Johnson75 declared that it was 
“independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [its] 
citizens.”76  The Minnesota court did go on to note, however, that 
where state constitutional provisions were practically identical to that 
of the Federal Constitution, a United States Supreme Court decision 
interpreting the federal provision would be an “inherently persuasive, 
although not necessarily compelling, force.”77 
Of course, state laws and the levels of protection proffered vary 
by jurisdiction.  California, for example, has a long tradition of 
 
state had authority to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more 
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution); Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (holding that the state court could interpret state constitutional 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures as being more restrictive than the 
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, but could not interpret the Fourth 
Amendment more restrictively than it was interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court). 
 70 Miller, 425 U.S. at 447, 454.  Justice Brennan wrote that “[t]he California 
Supreme Court has reached a conclusion under Art. I, § 13 [of the California 
constitution] in the same factual situation, contrary to that reached by the Court 
today under the Fourth Amendment.  I dissent because in my view the California 
Supreme Court correctly interpreted the relevant constitutional language.”  Id. 
 71 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (see supra note 63 for relevant text). 
 72 Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 215, 215 (1989). 
 73 485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. 1990). 
 74 Id. at 138. (emphasis added) 
 75 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979). 
 76 Id. at 405 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114 (Cal. 1975)); see 
also State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (noting that “[s]tate courts 
are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the 
federalist system”). 
 77 Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727. 
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expansive protection for individual rights, and its constitution 
explicitly provides for broader protection than the federal 
Constitution.78  Furthermore, California’s constitution specifically 
protects privacy rights: “All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.”79 
When applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Katz,80 California courts have 
held that individuals can reasonably expect that institutions such as 
banks,81 credit card companies,82 and telephone companies83 will not 
release information unless they are compelled by the legal process, 
and parties who seek such information must obtain a judicial finding 
that they are entitled to production.84 
Furthermore, in California, the therapist-patient evidentiary 
privilege is based on a constitutional right of privacy.85  California 
legislators have also drafted strong statutory protections for doctor-
patient privilege, providing that “[t]he willful, unauthorized violation 
of professional confidence constitutes unprofessional conduct.”86  
The California Code allows for records to be turned over 
notwithstanding the professional conduct statute, but states that 
“[a]ny document relevant to an investigation may be inspected, and 
copies may be obtained, where patient consent is given.”87  Therefore, 
statutory privilege in California extends to all professional 
 
 78 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (1974).  The California Constitution explicitly states 
that “[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”  Id.; see also City of Santa Barbara v. 
Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131 n.3 (1980) (stating that “the federal right of privacy in 
general appears to be narrower than what the voters approved in 1972 when they 
added ‘privacy’ to the California Constitution”). 
 79 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (the provision guaranteeing privacy rights was added on 
in 1972) (emphasis added). 
 80 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 81 See Burrows v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 238 (1974) (holding that an individual 
had a reasonable expectation that bank would maintain confidentiality of records). 
 82 See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640 (1979) (holding that the individual had 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding charges made on his credit card, and a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his telephone calls). 
 83 See id at 654-55 (rejecting reasoning of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979)). 
 84 Id. at 655. 
 85 See People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 511 (1983). 
 86 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2263 (West 2002). 
 87 § 2225(b)(1). 
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confidences, and patients are therefore accorded the opportunity to 
consent before their records are turned over, even if the request is 
served upon a third party.88  This policy will at least complicate 
attempts by law enforcement agents to conduct sweeping, unfocused 
investigations in California like the one attempted in Iowa. 
New York seemingly offers even more protection for individual 
privacy interests than California.  For example, New York’s 
constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure, like 
Iowa’s, also reads much like the Fourth Amendment.89  New York’s 
constitution particularly states, however, that the rights of people 
against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph 
communication shall not be violated, and asserts that 
ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or 
affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of 
crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of 
communication, and particularly describing the person or persons whose 
communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.90 
This expectation of privacy in the instance of private communications 
could reasonably be extended to encompass doctor-patient 
communications, specifically in the case of visitors to reproductive 
health clinics.  The investigators in Iowa, for instance, requested 
records from Planned Parenthood as a last resort after other means 
of gathering evidence were unsuccessful.  Thus, they showed no 
reason or expectation that a search of the clinic’s records would 
prove fruitful, nor could they describe any particular persons whose 
records might be relevant to their investigation.  The New York 
constitution would then seemingly provide a greater protection of 
patients’ privacy interest in their pregnancy tests because 
investigators would not be able to show a reasonable expectation that 
such an order would significantly benefit their investigation. 
New York also provides a wide range of statutory protections for 
privileged communications.  Confidential information is privileged 
not only in the instance of physicians, dentists, podiatrists, 
chiropractors, and nurses,91 but also for psychologists92 and social 
workers.93  These statutory protections are reinforced by New York 
common law.  In a 1983 decision, the New York Court of Appeals 
 
 88 See id. 
 89 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (providing security against unreasonable searches, 
seizures and interceptions). 
 90 Id. (emphasis added). 
 91 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4504 (McKinney 2002). 
 92 § 4507. 
 93 § 4508. 
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allowed a hospital to assert doctor-patient privilege in order to 
protect its patients and foster an effective doctor-patient 
relationship.94  The court held that the statutory doctor-patient 
privilege should be construed in accordance with its purpose, which 
is “to encourage full disclosure by the patient so that he can secure 
appropriate treatment from the physician.”95  It held that the statute 
is to be given “a broad and liberal construction to carry out its 
policy.”96  The court then stated that although the doctor-patient 
privilege belongs to the patient, the third party hospital or physician 
for the protection of a patient may assert it, even if the patient is 
suspected of or charged with a crime.97 
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that 
prosecutors cannot demand hospital medical records in their efforts 
to seek criminal suspects who have been wounded, holding that this 
would infringe upon patient confidentiality.98  Prosecutors sought to 
get around the earlier decision in Onondaga County99 by demanding 
all information “except any and all information acquired by a 
physician, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse in attending 
said patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to 
enable said doctor and/or nurse to act in that capacity.”100  The Court 
of Appeals refused to make the distinction, however, saying that 
 
 94 In the Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d 
130 (1983).  In this case, the District Attorney issued a subpoena requiring the 
hospital to produce “any and all medical records pertaining to treatment of any 
person with stab wounds or other wounds caused by a knife, from June 15, 1982 to 
the present time” after a woman was found stabbed to death.  Id. at 133.  But see 
People v. Bridges, 538 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1989) (holding that statutory social worker 
privilege did not apply to rape victim’s communications to volunteer counselor at 
rape crisis center). 
 95 Onondaga County, 59.N.Y.3d at 134 (quoting Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings 
[Doe], 56 N.Y.2d 348, 352 (1982)). 
 96 Id. (quoting Matter of City Council of New York v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 
300 (1940)). 
 97 Id. at 135. 
 98 In the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation in New York County, 98 N.Y.2d 525 
(2002); Robert F. Worth, Court Ruling Limits Prosecutors’ Access to Patient Records, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at B8.  The ruling stemmed from a case in which the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s office was looking for a suspect in a May 1998 murder whom 
investigators believed had been stabbed and bleeding when he left the crime scene.  
Id.  Subpoenas were issued to twenty-three area hospitals, seeking the records of 
every man who appeared to have suffered stab wounds around the time of the 
murder.  Id.  The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, which owned 
four of the hospitals that were subpoenaed, cited doctor-patient privilege in refusing 
to turn over the records.  Id. 
 99 Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.3d at 134. 
 100 See Worth, supra note 98, at B8. 
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prosecutors were simply seeking individuals with a particular injury.101  
The court further stated that “[p]atients should not fear that merely 
by obtaining emergency medical care they may lose the 
confidentiality of their medical records and their physicians’ medical 
determinations.”102  Women seeking counseling and care at 
reproductive health clinics may share a similar interest and concern 
in the confidentiality of their records and health care workers’ notes. 
The New York court also articulated three core policy objectives 
of the state’s doctor-patient privilege statute, which was the first of its 
kind:103 
First, the physician-patient privilege seeks to maximize unfettered 
patient communication with medical professionals, so that any 
potential embarrassment arising from public disclosure will not 
deter people from seeking medical help and securing adequate 
diagnosis and treatment.104  Second, the privilege encourages 
medical professionals to be candid in recording confidential 
information in patient medical records, and thereby averts a 
choice between their legal duty to testify and their professional 
obligation to honor their patients’ confidences.105  Third, the 
privilege protects patients’ reasonable privacy expectations 
against disclosure of sensitive personal information.106 
New York recognized not only the individual’s privacy interest in 
sensitive information, but also acknowledged the privacy interest of 
medical professionals and organizations, specifically the concern that 
breaches of privacy would deter the general populace from seeking 
treatment in the future.107  The New York County search was less broad 
and sweeping than the one attempted by law enforcement in Iowa.108  
In the restricted context of this instance, the statutory privilege, 
supported by a strong judicial interpretation, somewhat alleviates the 
gaps in privacy protection that affect patients seeking to shield their 
medical records. 
In contrast to the privacy protections guaranteed by other state 
constitutions, the parallel provision in the Iowa Constitution is far less 
expansive.  Because Iowa’s constitutional clause regarding search and 
 
 101 Id.  Justice Albert M. Rosenblatt wrote the unanimous opinion: “The inherently 
medical nature of this judgment is not obviated by attempting to qualify it in terms of 
what a layperson might plainly observe.” New York County, 98 N.Y.2d  at 531. 
 102 New York County, 98 N.Y.2d at 532. 
 103 Id. at 529. 
 104 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 105 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id, 98 N.Y.2d at 529. 
 108 See Clymer, supra note 1, at A1; see also New York County, 98 N.Y.2d at 526. 
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seizure is so similar to the United States Constitution, the Iowa 
Supreme Court has held that accordingly it usually interprets the 
“scope and purpose of article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution to 
track with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.”109  This 
reluctance to expand the meaning of the state constitutional 
provision would thus provide women visiting reproductive health 
clinics within the state with little added protection of individual 
privacy rights. 
Iowa’s statutory scheme also does not provide nearly as broad a 
protection of individual privacy in the face of criminal investigations 
as those in California and New York.  For example, an Iowa statute 
provides guidelines for communications in professional confidence: 
A practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, physician 
assistant, advanced registered nurse practitioner, [or] mental 
health professional . . . who obtains information by reason of the 
person’s employment . . . shall not be allowed, in giving testimony, 
to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to 
the person in the person’s professional capacity, and necessary 
and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions of the 
person’s office according to the usual course of practice or 
discipline.110 
This statute protects a wide range of confidential communications, 
extending privilege to counselors and assistants who obtain 
information because of their employment in a medical facility.  This 
statutory protection for privileged communication, however, is 
restricted to situations involving oral testimony in court or during a 
deposition.111  Thus, patients are left exposed when their records are 
requisitioned by court order or subpoena, allowing law enforcement 
to embark on a “fishing expedition” to gather evidence, so long as 
this information is not used during a judicial proceeding.112 
Common law doctor-patient privilege also protects patients to 
 
 109 State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Showalter, 
427 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Iowa 1988)). 
 110 IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2002) (emphasis added).  The language 
limiting confidentiality to situations where third parties are requested to give 
testimony is discussed at Part III infra.  But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.25 (West 2002): 
Medical records to be confidential—exceptions: “[T]he chief medical officer shall 
release appropriate information under any of the following circumstances: . . . (2) 
The information is sought by a court order.” 
 111 See Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Iowa 1986) 
(stating that “[t]estimony is a declaration by a witness in court or during a 
deposition”); see also discussion at Part III infra. 
 112 See Clymer, supra note 1, at A1. 
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some degree.113  In the Iowa case, for example, the relationships 
fostered by the Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa do qualify for 
privilege as defined by Wigmore.114  Visitors to reproductive health 
clinics depend upon the confidentiality of their consultations.115  A 
known lack of confidentiality could likely cause a retreat of women of 
diverse backgrounds from visiting these clinics.116  Critics challenge 
the assertion that privilege encourages communication, arguing that 
most know little or nothing about privilege, and that even those who 
do most likely would not take it into account in making decisions 
about communicating information to third parties.117  In the case of 
women visiting reproductive health clinics, however, it is unlikely that 
they would not be aware, at least to some degree, of the 
confidentiality that accompanies their visits.118  Admittedly, however, 
limited available data exists to show that most people believe they 
would not communicate as freely and completely without a 
privilege.119 
Iowa courts require three necessary elements to establish a 
doctor-patient privilege: “(1) the relationship of doctor-patient; (2) 
the acquisition of the information or knowledge during this 
relationship; and (3) the necessity of the information to enable the 
doctor to treat the patient skillfully.”120  In a situation such as the one 
facing the Planned Parenthood in Iowa, a health clinic could argue 
all three elements are satisfied.  First, the doctors and medical 
professionals at the clinic could certainly claim that a doctor-patient 
relationship is reasonably assumed when a woman visits the clinic.  
Furthermore, particularly in the case of reproductive health clinics, it 
 
 113 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 114 See WIGMORE, supra note 9. 
 115   Immediately after local law enforcement tried to force Planned 
Parenthood to open its records, the Planned Parenthood’s Storm Lake 
[Iowa] saw a 70-80 percent drop in women seeking pregnancy tests.  
This poses a serious health concern, considering that these women now 
may be dealing with a pregnancy on their own and may not return for 
early prenatal care or other vital reproductive health services provided 
at the center. 
Statement by Gloria Feldt, President, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
Inc., at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about/pr/020830_medicalprivacy.html 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2002) (on file with author). 
 116 See id. 
 117 Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1474 
(1985) [hereinafter Developments]. 
 118 See id. at 1475; see also Statement by Gloria Feldt, supra note 115. 
 119 See Developments, supra note 117, at 1476 (referencing two surveys that provide 
statistics based on very small samples). 
 120 Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981). 
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is very likely that the health professional will acquire sensitive 
information or knowledge in the course of this relationship.  The 
third element is particularly relevant, as women visiting reproductive 
health clinics rely on confidentiality and anonymity.121  Limiting 
doctor-patient privilege, even in the face of government 
investigations, could not only cause distress and harm to the patient 
whose privacy has been breached, but also weaken the reputation and 
integrity of the organization offering these services. 
III. LIMITATIONS: EXPOSING THE GAPS IN PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
Although doctor-patient privilege can be asserted through 
constitutional, statutory, and common law avenues, the protections 
they afford are limited, particularly in the face of government 
investigation.122  In some cases, the language of the statutes 
themselves limits the privacy protection it provides.123  Furthermore, 
the Fourth Amendment third party doctrine, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, could seriously curtail the 
doctor-patient privilege upon which many have come to depend, 
particularly in the instance of reproductive health clinics.124 
The Iowa statute that addresses doctor-patient privilege provides 
that communications in professional confidence shall not be 
disclosed “in giving testimony.”125  This protected privilege leaves a 
patient, seeking to protect his or her records, exposed in the face of a 
criminal investigation.  The privilege covered by the statute is limited 
to disclosure by the giving of testimony but does not speak to a 
 
 121 See Developments, supra note 117, at 1475. 
 122 See INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 64, at 207. 
 123 See Joy Pritts et al., The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain (A Comprehensive 
Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes), at http://www.healthprivacy.org (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with author). 
 124 See Solove, supra note 31, at 1135; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
104-06 (1980) (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
drugs concealed in girlfriend’s purse because he entrusted them to a third party).  
See generally Miller, 425 U.S. 435. 
 125 IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2002).  The statute states that: 
A practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, physician 
assistant, advanced registered nurse practitioner, mental health 
professional, or the stenographer or confidential clerk of any such 
person, who obtains information by reason of the person’s 
employment, or a member of the clergy shall not be allowed, in giving 
testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly 
entrusted to the person in the person’s professional capacity, and 
necessary and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions 
of the person’s office according to the usual course of practice or 
discipline. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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subpoena that commands the information for the purposes of a 
criminal investigation.126  Furthermore, Iowa courts have held that 
subpoenas of written records do not constitute the compulsion of 
confidential communications by the giving of testimony as protected 
by the statute, preferring to narrowly define “testimony” as a 
“declaration by a witness in court or during a deposition.”127  Thus, 
the statute offers no protection for patients in cases where law 
enforcement authorities demand information through a court 
order.128  This leaves discretion in the hands of the court to weigh the 
importance of the information to the criminal investigation against 
the individual’s privacy interest in keeping this information 
confidential.129 
 
 126 See id. 
 127 See Chidchester v. Needles, 353 N.W.2d 849, 851-52 (Iowa 1984) (holding that 
doctor-patient privilege did not shield a clinic from producing subpoenaed records 
because there was no disclosure by the giving of testimony, and that this disclosure 
did not violate privacy rights because this interest of patients yields to the state’s 
interest in administration of criminal justice); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 394 N.W.2d 
at 355 (Iowa 1986) (stating that “[s]ection 622.10 applies only to the testimonial use 
of privileged information . . . because it comes into play ‘in giving testimony.’  
Testimony is a declaration by a witness in court or during a deposition”). 
 128 IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 2002); see also § 229.25 (providing exceptions 
to confidentiality of medical records: “the chief medical officer shall release 
appropriate information under any of the following circumstances: . . . (2) The 
information is sought by a court order”). 
 129 See Chidchester, 353 N.W.2d at 853. 
However broad the patients’ constitutional privacy interest may be, that 
interest constitutes at most a qualified rather than an absolute 
privilege. The privacy interest must always be weighed against such 
public interests as the societal need for information, and a compelling 
need for information may override the privacy interest. . . .  We need 
not here decide the precise reach of the patients’ constitutional privacy 
right. Whatever that reach, the privacy interest must be balanced 
against society’s interest in securing information vital to the fair and 
effective administration of criminal justice. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Similar provisions stripping doctor-patient privilege 
of its significance limit other state and federal statutes.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
2225(a) (West 2002) (noting that, “notwithstanding Section 2263 and any other 
provision of law making a communication between a physician and surgeon or a 
podiatrist and his or her patients a privileged communication, those provisions shall 
not apply to investigations or proceedings conducted under this chapter”); Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, § 164.512(f)(1) (1996).  The statute 
states that: 
[H]ealth information may be disclosed to law enforcement officials 
without consent or authorization if required by court order, warrant or 
subpoena.  However, health information may also be disclosed ‘in 
response to a law enforcement official’s request for such information 
for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material 
witness, or missing person.’ 
Id. 
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And while common law doctor-patient privilege prohibits health 
care providers from disclosing any patient records, the privilege does 
not stand up against court orders and subpoenas.130  In most 
instances, prosecutors, rather than neutral judicial officers, control 
the issuance of subpoenas, dispersing them in the court’s name and 
invoking the court’s authority to enforce them.131  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions since Boyd have not developed any 
meaningful restraints on law enforcement officials’ power to issue 
subpoenas.132  Subpoenas are “presumed to be reasonable” and may 
only be quashed if “there is no reasonable possibility that the category 
of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant 
to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”133 
The gap in privacy protection is not covered by asserting 
common law doctor-patient privilege, and invoking the privilege 
proves troublesome in another way.  In Iowa, for example, courts 
require the party who seeks to invoke the privilege to show it exists.134  
This element is particularly problematic in the instant case where the 
people affected are numerous and unnamed, allowing state officials, 
armed with court orders and subpoenas, to avoid the burden of 
probable cause.135  Because it is the individual whose privacy interests 
 
 130 JO ANNE CZECOWSKI BRUCE, PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE 
INFORMATION 139 (2d ed. 1988). 
 131 Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents 
After United States v. Hubbell—New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
123, 173 (2002).  Cole further notes that federal prosecutors need not obtain prior 
authorization from the grand jury to issue a subpoena.  Id.; see also Solove, supra note 
31, at 1149. 
 132 Cole, supra note 131, at 176; see also Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (ruling that 
there is a presumption that a subpoena amounts to an unreasonable search and 
seizure).  But see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73 (1906) (holding that it was “quite 
clear that the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment was not intended 
to interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, 
the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence”); see also United 
States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (rejecting imposition of relevance 
or admissibility requirements on grand jury subpoenas). 
 133 R. Enter., 498 U.S. at 301. 
 134 State v. Tornquist, 120 N.W.2d 483, 495 (Iowa 1963). 
 135 See BRUCE, supra note 130, at 139; see also Solove, supra note 31, at 1149.  Solove 
points to procedural deficiencies in the statutory regime regulating the government’s 
access to third party records.  Id.  He quotes William J. Stuntz in discussing these 
deficiencies: 
[W]hile searches typically require probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion and sometimes require a warrant, subpoenas require 
nothing, save that the subpoena not be unreasonably burdensome to 
its target.  Few burdens are deemed unreasonable . . . [federal 
subpoena power is] akin to a blank check. 
William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 
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are at stake, the statute would only allow them to assert the privilege 
against the court order or subpoena, not the third party from which 
the information is being sought.136  Therefore, visitors to the clinic 
would have to come forward in order to assert the privilege, thus 
compromising their anonymity.137  Furthermore, this element does 
not allow for a third party to assert privilege in order to protect the 
records it has obtained in confidentiality.138 
Although the Fourth Amendment assures individuals protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure by imposing probable cause 
and specificity requirements upon warrants issued,139 these elements 
are negated in situations in which individuals share their personal 
information with third parties.140  Generally, the Fourth Amendment 
is interpreted to protect procedural privacy, and privacy can only be 
breached where the government shows a basis for believing the 
search would uncover evidence of a crime.141  In the Iowa case, the 
government would fail outright based on this factor if it were not 
seeking the information from a third party, as its “fishing expedition” 
was launched only after it exhausted other avenues of investigation. 
In Miller, however, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”142  
In Miller, the respondent appealed his conviction for carrying on the 
business of a distiller without giving bond and possessing whiskey 
upon which no taxes had been paid, contending that the lower court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress his bank records that had 
been subpoenaed.143  He argued that he had a Fourth Amendment 
interest in the documents because they were facsimiles of personal 
 
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 857-58, 864 (2001). 
 136 Tornquist, 120 N.W.2d at 495; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dtd. January 4, 
1984, 750 F.2d 223, 224 (2d. Cir. 1984) (noting that “[i]t is axiomatic that the 
burden is on a party claiming the privilege protection . . . to establish those facts that 
are the essential elements of the privileged relationship”); State v. Eldrenkamp, 541 
N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 1995); State v. Randle, 484 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Iowa 1992). 
 137 Randle, 484 N.W.2d at 221. 
 138 See id. 
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 140 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967).  As discussed in Part I supra, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard articulated in Katz also led the Court to indicate that such an expectation 
would not be found in information that was not kept secret, namely information that 
had been revealed to a third party, even in confidence.  See supra notes 40-46 and 
accompanying text. 
 141 See Colb, supra note 38, at 1643-44. 
 142 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 143 Id. at 436-37. 
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records given to the bank for a specific and limited purpose; thus, he 
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the records.144  
The Court disagreed, finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the contents of the respondent’s bank records.  Specifically, the 
Court characterized the checks and deposit slips not as confidential 
communications, but rather as “negotiable instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions.”145 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, 
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government. . . .  This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.146 
Thus, the “third party doctrine” effectively provides prosecutors with 
an end-run around the probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In Miller and subsequent decisions involving the 
extraction of personal information from third parties,147 the Court 
overlooked the “limited purpose” relationships in which people 
routinely engage.148 
Furthermore, the Court has denied privacy in whatever a person 
“knowingly exposes” to the public,149 treating information that is 
exposed to a limited number of people for a specific purpose as 
 
 144 Id. at 442. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 443.  But see Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238 (1974) (holding 
that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank statements and 
records and that the voluntary surrender of such records by the bank at the request 
of prosecutors does not constitute a valid consent by the accused; acquisition of the 
records was therefore the result of an illegal search and seizure); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 2225(b)(1) (West 2002), discussed in Part II supra. 
 147 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are not violated if evidence was seized during a search of a third 
person’s property); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding a 
person had no reasonable expectation of privacy once he entrusted items to a third 
party). 
 148 William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 39 (2001/2002).  Heffernan offers as an example people who take 
specific steps to ensure that their financial records are not exposed to the public 
nonetheless routinely use banks in order to engage in personal and commercial 
transactions.  Id. 
 149 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected.”). 
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tantamount to a public revelation.150  In holding that a person 
revealing information to a third party for a limited purpose no longer 
holds a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in that information, the 
Court adopted a very restrictive and limiting definition of that 
expectation, one that does not match the terms people expect in 
their everyday lives.151  If the third party doctrine is extended to cases 
such as the one in Iowa, there would consequently be little protection 
afforded to personal medical records compelled by the legal process, 
particularly when the information is sought by the government in the 
course of a criminal investigation. 
IV. BRIDGING THE PRIVACY GAP: A RATIONALE FOR LIMITATION OF 
THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE 
While a privacy interest in keeping medical records confidential 
is widely recognized,152 courts, scholars, and lawmakers alike have 
gone no further than applying a balancing test to determine whether 
the individual’s privacy interest is strong enough to outweigh the 
public interest in the free flow of information.153  This method may 
seem sensible on its face, particularly in the context of criminal 
investigations where law enforcement officials are trying to combat 
crime and administer justice.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court noted 
that the public interest in the goals of law enforcement “can never by 
 
 150 See Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search?  Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) [hereinafter Two 
Conceptual Flaws]. 
 151 Heffernan, supra note 148, at 44-45. 
The system of privacy hinges on a series of convention-based 
expectations as to how people will behave . . . .  These are reasonable 
expectations in that they constitute a widely acknowledged basis for 
social interaction.  Moreover, given the Fourth Amendment’s text, they 
are also legitimate expectations, for failure to honor them undermines 
a person’s sense of security in everyday life. 
Id. 
 152 Françoise Gilbert, Emerging Issues in Global AIDS Policy: Preserving Privacy, 25 
Whittier L. Rev. 273, 275 (2003): 
Medical information is among the most sensitive and personal 
information about an individual. Any unwanted access, use, or 
disclosure of a person’s health information could cause 
embarrassment, problems with family, or loss of revenue. . . .  A total 
commitment to ensuring privacy and security is central to the doctor- 
patient relationship. Without full access to the most intimate details, 
the physician cannot adequately treat the patient. . . .  On the other 
hand, the patient may be reluctant to disclose sensitive information 
based on fear that it will be disclosed to third parties . . . . 
Id. 
 153 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996). 
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itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment,”154 saying that the 
Amendment rests on the principle that “the privacy of a person’s 
home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of 
maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.”155 
In Whalen v. Roe,156 the Supreme Court articulated an alternate, 
two-prong analysis considering another balancing factor.157  In 
Whalen, the Court identified two different facets of privacy worth 
protecting.158  The first facet is the individual’s interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.159  The Court then identified another 
factor, which is ultimately the societal interest in maintaining 
independence in important decision-making.160 
The third party doctrine hampers not only the first prong of 
privacy interest articulated by the Court in Whalen, but also the 
second.161  Particularly in the case of people visiting reproductive 
health clinics, if one cannot be assured of confidentiality, one may 
simply choose not to visit the clinic.162  In a situation where 
confidentiality and privacy are held at a high priority, the amalgam of 
statutory provisions, common law privilege, and Fourth Amendment 
interpretations leaves a gap in privacy protection that may affect the 
crucial decisions of patients seeking medical care. 
More recently, in Jaffee v. Redmond,163 the Court framed a 
balancing test regarding the federal law of recognizing privilege 
under the rules of evidence, asking “whether a privilege protecting 
confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her 
patient ‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the 
need for probative evidence.’”164  The Court determined that an 
asserted privilege must also “serv[e] public ends,”165 concluding that 
 
 154 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
 155 Id. 
 156 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 157 Id. at 599-600. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 599. 
 160 Id. at 600; see Heffernan, supra note 148, at 51 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s 
fundamental error in its post-Katz jurisprudence is traceable to its failure to grasp 
privacy’s social function”). 
 161 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. 
 162 See Statement by Gloria Feldt, supra note 115; see also Developments, supra note 
117, at 1471. 
 163 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 164 Id. at 9-10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).  The 
Court went on to decide that the delicate nature of the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship was enough to outweigh the evidentiary needs of the situation.  Id. at 12. 
 165 Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). 
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“[t]he psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by 
facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering 
the effects of a mental or emotional problem.  The mental health of 
our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of 
transcendent importance.”166 
This analysis could certainly be extended to organizations 
providing reproductive health services for women of all 
socioeconomic groups.  In the instance of investigators obtaining 
records from reproductive health clinics by manner of court order or 
subpoena, such a balancing test may provide some protection of 
confidential medical information.  It would allow the medical 
professionals administering pregnancy tests to be viewed in a similar 
context as psychotherapists, and would weigh the societal importance 
of maintaining privacy in personal records against the public’s 
interest in the government’s ability to gather evidence to further a 
criminal investigation.  The privacy interest of women who visit a 
clinic could arguably outweigh the societal need for information, 
particularly in the instance of a blind search where there is little 
likelihood of finding any useful information.167  Furthermore, the 
clinic has an interest in keeping these medical records confidential to 
protect its integrity in the face of its role in the community.168 
The balancing tests favored by state and federal courts regarding 
the application of privilege against government requests for 
information, however, do not take the complexities of instances into 
account, such as the situation Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa 
faced when dealing with a court order demanding confidential 
records.  The vague boundaries of such tests require that the 
information sought must “serv[e] public ends,”169 or that a 
“compelling need for information may override the privacy 
interest.”170  Most courts examine the need for information and weigh 
it against the immediate privacy interests of the individual.171  This 
 
 166 Id. at 11 (emphasis added); see also McMaster v. Iowa Bd. of Psychology 
Examiners, 509 N.W.2d 754, 759 (Iowa 1993).  In this case, the Iowa Supreme Court 
held that a Board of Psychology Examiners had the authority to subpoena records, 
but that they could not do so unless it showed that its need for the records 
outweighed a patient’s right to privacy.  Id.  “The privacy interest must always be 
weighed against such public interests as the societal need for information, and a 
compelling need for information may override the privacy interest.” Id. 
 167 See Basu, supra note 6; New York County, 779 N.E.2d at 175. 
 168 See Basu, supra note 6; Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11; Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d  278, 
284 (1989). 
 169 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
 170 McMaster, 509 N.W.2d at 759. 
 171 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (allowing that privilege may serve “public ends” and 
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methodology may ignore the long-term implications of these 
decisions, which may affect the individual’s confidence when 
deciding to place her trust with a reproductive health clinic.  This 
may ultimately undermine the service that these clinics provide to a 
certain segment of society. 
Medical records differ fundamentally from bank records and 
telephone calls.172  In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,173 the 
Ninth Circuit dealt with the collection of medical information by 
illicit means, but acknowledged that cases defining the privacy 
interest in medical information have typically involved disclosure to 
third parties.174  The court recognized that constitutionally protected 
privacy interests plainly included medical information and an interest 
in its confidentiality.175  The court further asserted that few areas are 
“more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than 
that of one’s health or genetic make-up.”176  The third party theory is 
arguably valid in the face of criminal investigations into corporate 
wrongdoing and criminal activity.  Confidences involving personal 
finances and communications, while they do involve some reasonable 
expectation of privacy, do not carry the same sort of personal 
sensitivity as the personal details of an individual’s body.177  Thus, the 
idea of the government being allowed access to bank and telephone 
records does not inspire the same sort of dismay as access to medical 
records; people would most likely continue to use banks and 
telephones even with the knowledge that these records could be 
open in a criminal investigation. 
The Fourth Amendment third party mechanism should not be 
applied in the same way to medical records held by hospitals and 
clinics as it is to banks and telephone companies.  When law 
enforcers request these records in search of evidence of a crime, the 
 
acknowledging an interest in maintaining an outlet that serves the public). 
 172 Roy G. Beran, The Doctor/Patient Relationship, Confidentiality and Public 
Responsibility, 21 MED. & L. 617, 617 (2002): 
The principle of confidentiality is fundamental to the relationship 
between doctor and patient.  Respect for confidentiality, as with 
consent, gives expression to the patient’s autonomy by acknowledging 
that it is the patient who controls any information relating to his or her 
medical condition or treatment.  Medical information should not be 
divulged by a physician except with the consent of the patient. 
Id. (quoting THE ROYAL AUSTRALASIAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS (RACP), ETHICS: A 
MANUAL FOR CONSULTANT PHYSICIANS 16 (1992)). 
 173 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 1269. 
 176 Id. 
 177 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 151 (1999). 
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rules of particularity and specific suspicion inherent in the original 
language of the Fourth Amendment should apply.178  Despite 
additional statutory provisions defining and providing for the 
protection of confidential communications and patient medical 
records, there remains a gap between these measures and federal and 
state constitutional provisions for individual rights.  Rather than 
applying the third party doctrine in cases involving medical records, a 
more effective means of assuring individual privacy rights requires 
the strict adherence to the probable cause element of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Law enforcement officers should have to show 
particulars regarding the persons or places they propose to search.  
In addition, they should demonstrate that the information sought is 
likely to provide investigators with relevant evidence to further their 
cases.  Such requirements, added to existing statutory and common 
law protection, are likely to provide sufficient protection for 
individuals concerned with their medical privacy and will begin to 
bridge the current gap in medical privacy protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The protections afforded those who visit reproductive health 
centers are inadequate to protect their privacy interests.  Although 
states may provide more expansive safeguards, state statutes still leave 
gaps in privacy protection.  And while many states recognize a 
common law doctor-patient privilege, it is qualified by balancing the 
privacy rights of the individual with the societal interest in the 
information potentially revealed by the privileged communication, 
particularly in the context of criminal investigations.  This added 
consideration in the application of the privilege places the privacy 
concerns of innocent people on a low priority in the face of 
unfocused criminal investigations and allows government officials to 
run roughshod over the privacy of the individual in the name of 
efficient law enforcement. 
 
 178 Id. at 151-52.  Etzioni states that: 
[T]he American legal system already allows the search of records if a 
reasonable case can be made for doing so.  If the FBI or a local police 
seeks to examine any private records, say a person’s or a corporation’s 
financial files, that authority needs to provide evidence to a magistrate 
that there is reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is being 
committed.  There seems to be no reason that medical records, 
correctly considered more intimate and hence having a higher claim to 
privacy, should be accessed more easily.  In this scenario, if there is a 
legitimate need, a warrant can be obtained, but otherwise privacy can 
be well guarded. 
Id. at 151. (emphasis added) 
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The analysis is further exacerbated by the possibility that courts 
could apply the third party doctrine to allow law enforcement access 
to patients’ medical records without consent or a specific warrant 
fulfilling the probable cause requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Applying the third party exception to Fourth 
Amendment protections in this instance would be illogical.  The 
individual holds a privacy interest in his or her medical records, and 
when he or she has “given” this information to a third party for a 
limited and specific purpose, one cannot reasonably infer that he or 
she has waived this interest.  Furthermore, at the time the individual 
is sharing his or her personal information with a medical 
professional, he or she retains a “reasonable expectation of privacy”179 
in these records by any societal standards—to hold otherwise is 
unnecessarily restrictive.  The unique and intimate nature of medical 
information has nearly always been held as a high priority.180  To allow 
the patient’s confidence to be breached without showing specific 
probable cause or a particular suspicion is unreasonable and 
unnecessary.  Thus, the third party doctrine should be barred at the 
health professional’s door, and a patient’s medical records should 
remain private until law enforcement can specifically justify a breach 
of the individual’s privacy. 
 
 
 179 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). 
 180 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470-72 (2002). 
